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Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or
Essential Feature?
Johannes Gerschewski
Legitimacy is a key concept in political science. It has deep normative roots in democratic theory and refers usually to
righteous, just, fair, and therefore acceptable rule. However, non-democracies also try to create a following among their
citizens. They also engage in justifying their rule through politicization, be it of religion, ethnicity, or ideologies ranging from
left-wing communism to right-wing nationalism. Against this backdrop, I pose the question: does it make sense to use the
concept of legitimacy for both types of regimes, democracies and autocracies alike? Or, do we overstretch the concept when
transplanting it to the non-democratic realm? And, empirically, how can we assess to what degree a non-democracy is viewed
as legitimate by its citizens? I aim therefore at defining what legitimacy and legitimation is in autocratic settings; drawing
a semantic map of rival concepts like support, trust, and loyalty; and tackling concrete challenges in measuring this elusive
concept.
Legitimacy in an Unlikely Context?
I s there something like legitimacy in autocracies?
1
Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, this was a hotly
debated question when scholars disagreed about the
nature of Soviet-type regimes. While one camp argued
that the communist regimes do indeed create legitimacy
among its citizens, the other camp criticized these
accounts for concept stretching and for neglecting the
normative roots of the term legitimacy.2 For critics,
there was no such thing as legitimacy in autocracies, let
alone in communist regimes.
This debate is not an outdated one among old-
fashioned scholars and Kremlinologists. Instead, it is
a timely endeavor that has not lost its relevance for
political scientists and practitioners. Around the world,
we currently observe a rise of autocratic leaders who claim
to be legitimated by their people. Ranging from Vladimir
Putin in today’s Russia, to the general secretaries of
China’s one-party-rule, but also to political leaders like
Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an in Turkey and Viktor Orbán in
Hungary who gradually slid into authoritarianism, all of
them claim to be entitled to rule by their citizens.
The question of whether there is something like legiti-
macy in autocracies has also resurfaced in academia. Today,
we know more about the inner workings of non-democratic
regimes. In recent years, social sciences observed a renais-
sance in the study of comparative authoritarianism.3 Key
institutions have been analyzed: from political parties4 to
elections,5 from parliaments6 to informal power sharing
arrangements.7 These institutions are understood to be
crucial for autocratic rule.
Within this renaissance, a new strand of research has
picked up the old legitimacy debate and asked whether
autocratic regimes—besides using repressive techniques and
co-opting potential elites—do stabilize their rule by seeking
the support of the people.8 From a rational perspective, this
would make sense for the autocratic regime: Repressing
opposition is a costly endeavor—at least in the long run.
Repression creates counterproductive incentives as it spikes
protest. From the autocrat’s perspective, these unintended
consequences need to be avoided.9 These researchers argue
therefore that autocratic regimes need to legitimate their rule
in order to maintain stable over a longer time period. Unless
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the regimes are mere kleptocracies or sheer tyrannies, they
need to furnish a persuasive raison d’être.
In this light, this conceptual essay analyzes the capacity
of the concept “legitimacy” to travel to the non-
democratic realm. It poses the following questions:
Is legitimacy the proper concept for social scientists to
describe that autocratic rulers seek the support of the
people? Or, do we overstretch the concept (and even fall in
the trap of autocratic leaders) when we apply it to non-
democratic rule? In other words, is “legitimacy in autoc-
racy” an oxymoron, a “wooden iron,” or does it refer to an
essential and stabilizing feature of autocratic rule? And
finally, if legitimacy is indeed the proper concept, how do
we know it when we see it?
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows.
I will first argue how we can define such a concept for
autocratic regimes. Based on this definitional discussion,
I will draw a semantic map of neighboring concepts and
discuss their respective strengths and weaknesses. I will
then clarify where the differences between legitimacy in
autocratic and democratic regimes lie. I will expose the
challenges posed by measurement, followed by a brief
conclusion.
Systematizing Concept Analysis: The
Ogden-Richards Triangle
A good starting point for any kind of concept analysis is
the Ogden-Richards triangle.10 It displays a trilateral
relationship between the given name of a concept, its
meaning (intension), and its empirical referent (exten-
sion). Take the following intuitive example: A “table”
(name) has the minimal meaning of a raised levelness
(intension) that refers, e.g., to a range of empirically
observable tables in a seminar room (extension). The
relationship between these three corners of the triangle is
not always as straightforward as in this example. If we
translate the basic linguistic triangle to the social science
world, several challenges arise. Yet a systematic diagnosis of
a concept takes seriously the relationships between name,
intension, and extension (please see figure 1).
Let us first consider the relationship between name and
meaning. While, according to the famous French linguist
de Saussure, the name is given arbitrarily and usually
based on social convention, the relationship between the
name and the intension can be plagued by conceptual
ambiguity. A 1:1 relationship between a given term and
its intension may have been desired since Aristotle’s
classic works, but the majority of today’s linguists agree
that language is much fuzzier. In particular, the polysemic
nature of concepts (one word, many meanings) troubles
the work of social scientists considerably. Concepts cannot
be clearly distinguished from each other but instead
overlap and so leave room for multiple interpretations.
Together with their neighboring concepts, concepts form
“semantic fields” that can be mapped.11 Moreover, the
relationship between the name and the meaning of
a concept can suffer from definitional shortcomings.
In general, the definition must be as sharp and parsimo-
nious as possible, and the defining features should inhibit
sufficient discriminatory power vis-à-vis other features.
The set of defining features should also be jointly
exhaustive and should be established at the same level of
abstraction. A further demand is that a definition should
not include contradictory features.
Secondly, when it comes to the delicate balance
between the name and the empirical referent, the core
question is how do we know it when we see it? How do
we identify an empirically observable object as being
subsumed under the term? Like identifying that the piece
of furniture is a table, we similarly need to identify
legitimacy and legitimation efforts as such when observ-
ing them in an empirical instance. This, of course, is not
a trivial challenge.
Lastly, the balance between intension and extension
has found its way into the social sciences under the term
“ladder of abstraction.”12 The relationship between in-
tension and extension is inverse; an increase in the
intension leads to a decrease of extension. If one adds to
the intension (e.g., color, number of legs, material) to
“table,” the empirical counterparts of tables to which this
new intension matches decreases. In other words, if a table
is not only defined by raised levelness, but also by having
four legs and being composed of wood, then the number of
empirical referents falls. This basic insight requires an apt
calibration in choosing not just the right conceptual
components, but also an adequate number and range of
them in order to avoid over-determination and vagueness.
When conceptualizing legitimacy in autocracies, this will
be an important caveat.
In the following section, I will discuss the fruitfulness
of applying the concept of legitimacy to non-democratic
Figure 1
The Ogden-Richards triangle
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settings by discussing the respective bilateral relationships
between name, intension, and extension.
Name versus Intension: Defining
Legitimacy in Autocratic Settings
The biggest challenge in the relationship between name
and intension (meaning) lies in avoiding conceptual
ambiguity. Ideally, concepts should be delineated from
each other. A primary way to do so is to define the
concept, i.e., in the literal sense to set its borders. Based
on a definition of legitimacy, I will then draw a semantic
map of its three most prominent, neighboring, and rival
concepts: support, trust, and loyalty.
A Definition
Etymologically, legitimacy is “according to the law” (legi
intimus).13 For centuries, the term has been used to
distinguish tyrannical rule from right and just rule.
Throughout its conceptual history it has been used to
describe democratic polities. It carries a strong positive
connotation. “Legitimate” is equated with being good and
fair; it is understood as being just, and therefore acceptable.
However, the term legitimacy has also non-normative
roots. This line of its conceptual legacy goes back to the
strictly empirical usage of legitimacy in Max Weber’s work.
In general, Weber strived to free the term from normative
ballast by arguing that we should not focus on how a rule
ought to be, but rather to account for how it is.14 Weber
argued in favor of an empirically observable “belief in
legitimacy.”15 That paved the way for a usage of the term
beyond normative democratic theory. And indeed, if we take
Weber’s three types of legitimate rule, the legal-rational, the
traditional, and the charismatic rule, two of the three have
non-democratic roots. Only the legal-rational type of rule
refers to the adherence to (mostly democratic) procedures.
Legitimacy is a relational concept arising between the
ruler and the ruled. Rule (or more generally domination)
is classically defined as the “probability that certain
specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by
a given group of persons.”16 As such, Weber sees
domination/rule as a subset of power. In a dyadic relation-
ship between a superior A and an inferior B, the difference
between power and rule lies in the attitude of B towards A.
Power lets B do what A wants, irrespective of her attitude.
In a rule relationship, B acknowledges the authority and
sees the entitlement claim of A as being justifiable. B
believes in the right of A to rule. The transmission belt
between A and B is therefore one of command and
obedience. It has its roots in the study of military
organizations. Its major value is discipline and discipline
is habitually trained. Weber captures this transmission
belt in the German original aptly as “Gehorsamspflicht,”
i.e., the obligation to obey.17
In an influential critique, Beetham has argued that
Weber’s legitimate rule typology is severely flawed. For
him, it collapses several dimensions into one. Beetham
disentangled the implicit dimensions and argued that we
should make the multi-dimensionality of the concept
explicit. For him, three criteria need to be assessed
individually: legality, justifiability, and the concrete
expression of consent.18 These three criteria, although
developed in reference to democratic polities, can be made
fruitful for the study of non-democratic polities as well.
Beetham argued that power needs to be “acquired and
exercised in accordance to the established rules.”19 By so
doing, it is oriented towards the Weberian ideal type of
legal-rational rule and the etymological legalistic origin of
the term. This poses difficulties in translation to non-
democratic contexts. Legality usually goes hand-in-hand
with democratic rule. Yet if we follow a narrower
understanding, i.e., of “settled expectations” in order to
ensure predictability,20 then the route to applying legiti-
macy to autocracies becomes easier to travel. The argu-
ment is that only if norms have settled, their effects unfold.
Although Beetham has not explicitly argued this way,
I understand his first criterion as a necessary condition for
legitimacy. Only when the established rules are settled can
legitimacy be achieved. As such, it is a prerequisite for
legitimacy. Only if people accept the established rules
through Weberian habituation over time does this estab-
lish the necessary condition for a legitimacy belief by the
people. Irrespective of their political content, expectations
need to be stable in order to be effective. In this sense, this
first criterion can be translated to the realm of legitimacy in
an autocratic context.
Secondly, existing norms need to be justified. They do
not acquire full force if they remain in a legal sphere.
Instead, rulers need to offer a justification of why the
rulers are entitled to rule. Rulers need to credibly anchor
their legitimacy claim in the hearts and minds of the
people. Anchor points can be diverse. On the one hand,
historical narratives can be used to differentiate from
former rule (e.g., anti-colonial struggle, civil war). On the
other hand, narratives can be built that create a religious,
ethnic, or ideological unity. Yet it should be noted that
this justifiability should not be restricted only to the
ruled. But the ruler needs what Barker has called
“endogenous or self-legitimation.”21 Governments must
also demonstrate to themselves that they are entitled to
rule. It is characteristic to all kinds of governments “just
as worship is one of the characterizing activities of
religion.”22
The third criterion refers to the explicit transmission of
legitimacy. This can take the form of swearing an oath, of
going to the polls, or of organizing a mass rally. There is
a variety of legitimating transmission forms. What is
important is that there is any action that “confers
legitimacy on the powerful.”23 We know that, for exam-
ple, communist regimes have been particularly successful
in manufacturing a legitimacy transfer by making use of
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rallies, organizations, and holding (symbolic) elections.
However, non-communist regimes also engage regularly in
(semi- and non-competitive) elections and other events
that serve as a transmission belt for acquiring legitimacy.
With these refinements in mind, we can make use of
the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation even beyond
the democratic realm. We can define it in the following
way: Legitimacy is a relational concept between the ruler
and the ruled in which the ruled sees the entitlement
claims of the ruler as being justified, and follows them
based on a perceived obligation to obey. The legitimating
norms must constitute settled expectations in order to be
fully effective and must be actively transferred. The extent
of legitimacy can so be defined as the strength (how
deep?) and width (how many?) of the relational bond
between the ruler and the ruled.
A last word on the difference between legitimacy and
legitimation is in place here. I concur with Barker
and other scholars that legitimacy is an ascribed attribute
and a property of an object (e.g., a regime), while
legitimation refers to the process of gaining legitimacy.
While the former is a property, the latter is an action.
While the former can be normatively grounded, the latter
refers to an empirically observable activity.24 It might
therefore be in general less “demanding” to talk of
legitimation in autocracies (understood as the attempt of
the ruler to gain a following) than of legitimacy in
autocracies. While most scholars would agree that even
autocrats spend time and effort in justifying their rule—
whether via propagandistic media channels, political
education programs, performance, or even the hosting of
prestigious international sport events and spectacles—
democratic theorists might be tempted to refute the very
idea of legitimacy being applicable to non-democratic
settings. Due to the term’s rich historical lineage and the
deep interweavement between legitimacy and a just and
fair democratic polity in the history of Western political
thought, this refutation takes place on solid ground.25
Non-democratic settings entail coercive environments that
make invocation of legitimacy inappropriate. For this
sceptic view, legitimate authoritarianism remains neces-
sarily a “wooden iron”; it is an oxymoron.
Neighboring Terms of Support, Trust, and Loyalty
In order to identify the core differences and similarities of
neighboring concepts, it is a fruitful endeavor to draw
a semantic map. Neighboring concepts that capture the
phenomenon that all political regimes try to create
a following among its ruled population are support, trust,
and loyalty. These rival concepts will be delineated from
the concept of legitimacy.
Support is the most neutral and most encompassing
term that can be used. Scholars have been more comfort-
able using this concept in non-democratic contexts.26 It
does not contain the normative ballast of legitimacy. The
concept of support is therefore more rooted in the
empirical, sociological tradition than in normative demo-
cratic theory. As it stems from systems theory, it also allows
an application to all types of political systems. David
Easton’s long shadow on today’s political science is still
tangible. Fifty years ago, he defined political support as
follows: “We can say that A supports B either when A acts
on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward
B.”27 In this sense, Easton placed emphasis on both the
action and the attitude. Easton distinguished between two
modi of support. Diffuse support is long-term oriented
and represents “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good
will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to
which they are opposed.”28 Specific support, in turn, is
more short-term oriented. Scharpf’s output legitimacy that
is rather “interest based than identity based”29 comes close
to Easton’s specific support. With this in mind, I would
suggest the following for delineating support from legiti-
macy.30 While one can support a regime for different
reasons, be it either out of ideational conviction or only out
of utilitarian cost-benefit calculations, legitimacy necessar-
ily refers to favorable attitudes towards the ruler. In this
sense, Easton’s diffuse and specific support is more
encompassing than legitimacy.
If we cross-tabulate attitude and behavior and use
the rather coarse-grained values of “pro-regime,” “anti-
regime,” and “indifferent,” then the matrix in Table 1 can
be constructed.31 It demonstrates both the overlap and the
difference between the two concepts. I have added in the
fourth column a possible description for how we could
name these actors.
I suggest that in order to apply the concept of
legitimacy, the belief of the people must be necessarily
either pro-regime or at least politically indifferent. I read
Easton’s definition of support (“A supports B either when
A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably
toward B”)32 as being connected with a logical “OR.”
Therefore, either the belief or the action must be present.
With this in mind, I propose that the overlap between
the two concepts occurs from type 1 agents (true believers)
through type 3 agents (unmobilized supporters). They all
hold a pro-regime belief regardless of their behavior.
Holding political indifferent beliefs while displaying pro-
regime behavior, type 4 agents might be perceived as
controversial. They are either conformists, careerists, or
just apathetic followers. For the distinction between
support and legitimacy, this is a borderline case. A strict
application of legitimacy as being in favor of the regime
would exclude these people. Being indifferent is not
necessarily believing; therefore, this group would not fall
in the legitimacy camp. A looser understanding of political
indifference, however, would include this group. While it
is clear that these type 4 agents support the regime with
their behavior (and so stabilize it), they are the undeter-
mined, wavering group of people. On the mass level, they
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are apathetic and conformist. On the elite level, they
would pursue a (political) career—irrespective of the
regime form. As these groups ultimately decide to act in
favor of the regime, I tend to classify them inside and not
outside the legitimacy rubric.
Type 2 agents also need some more elaboration. They
have in general a pro-regime attitude, but undermine the
regime stability with anti-regime behavior. Usually, this
group tends to be rather small. They follow a strategical
plan to come to power themselves by plotting a coup
against what Svolik described as the “ruling coalition.”33
However, they share the same favorable general attitudes
towards the regime and view it as the appropriate form
of government. Type 5 actors (opportunists) mark an
important difference. They are characterized by an anti-
regime attitude and a pro-regime behavior. Against this
backdrop, this group can be delineated from type 4 agents.
They are opportunists and not conformist. They act as if
they were in favor of the regime, but they are not. Lisa
Wedeen’s important ethnographic study on Syria of Hafiz
al-Asad is one of the accounts in which this “as if action” is
portrayed. Surrounded by an immense personality cult,
Syrians acted as if they revered the leader—which, in turn,
installed a subtle and habitualized obedience into their
hearts andminds.34 This group of people, whose size varies
over different regimes, supports the regime without
viewing it as legitimate.
The distinction between support and legitimacy can
be traced back to the different motivations why a person
supports a regime. People who holds anti-regime beliefs
but act as if they were in favor of it follow a utilitarian
motivation based on cost-benefit calculus. They do not
support the regime because they view it as being entitled
to rule, but rather out of strategic considerations and out
of the sheer fear of repression. Of course, social science
scholars should abstain from a holier-than-thou attitude
and eschew moral judgements of this group. These
actors keep quiet as they know that acting according to
their beliefs will pose an often existential threat to them.
What can be stated is that type 4 agents (conformists)
constitute a borderline case in which the regime might
be viewed as legitimate, while type 5 agents clearly do
not do so.
Type 6 through type 8 agents describe different facets
of the opposition. Type 8 is the mirror image of type 1
agents. It is the group of people that form the true and
active opposition that view the regime as being illegit-
imate and act accordingly. Type 6 and type 7 agents are
then groups that are either repressed and therefore
remain passive or represent the wavering group that
can be mobilized by the opposition. What is important
to note is that when cross-tabulating attitude and
behavior, we can identify a considerable overlap between
legitimacy and support. However, the difference lies in
the group of “as if actors” that mark the difference in the
conceptual scope.
A second neighboring and rival concept is political
trust. Easton’s diffuse and specific support had a lasting
influence on this concept as well.35 In survey research,
a battery of questions is usually asked. Survey items like
trust in the government, the party, the parliament, the
military, or the police, etc. are widespread. In this light,
Levi and Stoker have summarized “a minimal consensus.”
For them, trust is—like legitimacy—relational. It involves
an “individual making herself vulnerable to another in-
dividual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do
her harm and to betray her.”36 In a similar vein, Kaase has
defined trust as both asymmetrical and relational.37 There
is one dominant A (government) who is trusted by
a subordinate B (citizen). B trusts that A acts in B’s
interest. However, B cannot be sure about A’s real
intentions. Therefore, trust can be understood as “encap-
sulated interest.”38 Trustworthy is then someone who
credibly acts in the interest of the truster—and who has
the actual competence to do so.39 Trust is therefore
instrumental and evaluates the performance and effective-
ness of the trustee.
With this in mind, the semantic overlap between
legitimacy and trust lies in its relational character between
a dominant A and a subordinate B. Both relationships are
Table 1
Belief versus behavior
Type Belief Behavior Name for Actors Legitimacy Support
1 Pro-regime Pro-regime True believers, convinced supporters yes yes
2 Pro-regime Anti-regime Strategic coup plotters
3 Pro-regime Indifferent Unmobilized supporters of regime
4 Indifferent Pro-regime Conformist and apathetic followers, careerists
5 Anti-regime Pro-regime Opportunists (As-if-action) no yes
6 Anti-regime Indifferent Unmobilized and repressed opposition no no
7 Indifferent Anti-regime Mobilized by opposition
8 Anti-regime Anti-regime Activist, true opposition
Source: Author
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asymmetric, between the trustee and the trusted and
between the ruler and the ruled. However, there is
nuance in the trust concept that refers to the competence
of the trustee to fulfill the interest of the truster. Trust as
encapsulated interest speaks more to a performative side
of legitimacy while tending to neglect the ideational side.
It can therefore be seen as a subset of legitimacy. Trust is
also a subset of legitimacy in a second instance. Trust
tends to refer to more concrete institutions like govern-
ment, party, or parliament. It is rarely invoked in
reference to the broader community and the identity of
a nation. This is the realm of legitimacy. At least in the
Weberian understanding of legitimate rule, legitimacy
seems to be the more adequate term to characterize
political rule and regimes as a whole.
Lastly, loyalty is also defined here as a partial subset of
legitimacy. I argue that loyalty differs from legitimacy in
important ways. A narrow definition of loyalty refers to
an emotional, deeply affective, and non-rational attach-
ment to a group.40 Loyalty “adds a layer of faithfulness
and utmost reliability.”41 In most accounts, loyalty is an
inter-human relationship that is asymmetrical, often hint-
ing “subservience and inequality”42 of the subordinate
B vis-à-vis the dominant A. In contrast, legitimacy,
support, and trust are less imbued with this non-rational
faithfulness.
Loyalty is also rather reactive. Consider the canonical
book by Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.43 He
understood these options as “responses to a decline in
firms, organizations, and states.” In a deteriorating situa-
tion, the two basic responses are either to leave or to voice
discontent. The function of loyalty is then twofold: it
“holds exit at bay and activates voice.”44 As such, loyalty
acts as a crisis catalyst.45 Loyalty can be observed most
clearly in a direct reaction to a crisis situation. When being
challenged, loyalty becomes more obvious.
Yet, there is a general danger of confusing the
observability of a phenomenon with its definition. To
some extent, trust works the same way as loyalty. When
being challenged, trust becomes easier to observe. A given
challenge can be the litmus test by which scholars can
decide if B trusts A or not. Yet being challenged is not
part of the definition of trust. Citizen B can trust her
government A, regardless of whether it ever faced
difficulties. Loyalty with its connotation of faithfulness,
commitment, and emotional bonding strongly incorpo-
rates the idea that it is a crisis reaction. I follow here Gert,
who argued that loyalty “requires an individual to be
willing to make significant personal sacrifice.”46 Despite
problems, troubles, and challenges, subordinate B remains
loyal to dominant A and accepts personal costs. Loyalty
inherently implies a concessive conjunction. I argue that
loyalty follows the slogan “right or wrong, my country/ my
king/ my boss/ my family” etc. Ups and downs are almost
necessary to speak about loyalty. At least a case could be
made that loyalty is not only seen most clearly in times of
crisis, but that a challenge of any sort is a prerequisite for
even using the concept. As such, loyalty is a robust and
stretchable bond, but might tend to be less durable and
persistent.
One does not need to follow this line of argument to
the end, but what is important to note is the following:
Even if I view an action, a decision, or a regime as bad,
wrong, false, or illegitimate, I can remain loyal. Legiti-
macy, instead, would require that I view the action as
being justified. This is why loyalty is a partial subset of
legitimacy. The sets can overlap when actors are loyal to
a regime that they view as legitimate. But they can also
remain loyal even if they view the regime as illegitimate.
Loyalty can also be delineated from legitimacy with
regard to the addressee. While legitimacy refers to the
population in general, loyalty tends to refers to a smaller
circle of people. Loyalty is usually elite-centered. This has
to do with potential future gains that motivate loyal
behavior. The cooptation literature in comparative
authoritarianism highlights this point. Notably, this
strand of literature understands loyalty in a political
economy perspective. For them, loyalty is not based on
deep affection, but rather on rational cost-benefit calcu-
lus. The argument is straightforward: cronies remain loyal
and do not revolt against the regime as long as they can
be bought off via policy concessions, material spoils, or
other revenues—or at least as long as the assurance that
they benefit from the current regime is credible.47 Facing
hard budget constraints, loyalty needs to be focused on key
persons and can only be in rare circumstances dispersed to
the masses.
If we stick to the original definition of loyalty and
maintain that a group remains loyal out of deep
conviction, then the size of this group is usually also
restricted. This group is then populated only with the
type 1 actors described above. These are the true believers
and it is empirically very rare that a society is composed
only of true believers. Even North Koreans, as currently
the most homogenous and by far the most indoctrinated
society today, is viewed in newer research as much more
fragmented than common images of the country might
depict.48 Loyalty tends to be more of an elite, rather than
a mass, phenomenon.
Loyalty is therefore a partial subset of legitimacy. It has
a stronger connotation of an affective, even non-rational
faithfulness. It works as a catalyst that postpones exit and
strengthens voice. It is reactive in a sense that despite
problems, despite viewing an action or a regime as wrong
or illegitimate, actors can remain loyal. Lastly, loyalty is
usually restricted to a smaller group of people and is elite
centered.
To sum up, major neighboring concepts to legitimacy
are support, trust, and loyalty. Support is a superset of
legitimacy as it also subsumes actors under its semantic
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umbrella who hold anti-regime beliefs but act as if they
were actually in favor of the regime. Trust and loyalty are
(partial) subsets of legitimacy. While the former refers to
encapsulated interests and therefore more to a perfor-
mance evaluation, the latter is a more elite-centered,
emotional attachment that remains despite problems and
challenges. As such, legitimacy can be placed in the
middle between support on the one hand and trust and
loyalty on the other hand. The concepts are therefore
different in scope. They can embrace actors who both
support the ruler, view her as legitimate, trust her, and
remain loyal even in contested times. However, the Venn
diagram in figure 2 shows also that this is not necessarily
the case. Actors can be loyal and supportive despite
viewing the regime as illegitimate.
Extension versus Intension: Finding
a Balance in the Ladder of Abstraction
The relationship between extension and intension, i.e.,
between empirical referents in the outside world and
semantic meanings of a term, has been popularized in the
social science by Giovanni Sartori. Using the “ladder of
abstraction” (sometimes also “ladder of generality”),49
scholars attempt to find a balance between defining
features on the one hand and empirical referents on the
other. The relationship is inverse. Increasing intension
leads to a decreasing of extension and vice versa. This basic
insight demands therefore from social scientists an apt
calibration in not only choosing the right features, but also
thinking carefully about an apt number and range of
conceptual components. In this sense, I use the ladder of
abstraction as a definitional tool that helps in distinguish-
ing minimalist from maximalist understandings of legiti-
macy.
Legitimacy incorporates various defining features—
depending on “which satisfy the criteria laid open by the
observer.”50 Weatherford has summarized them in four
points that appear across a large body of literature:
(1) accountability, (2) efficiency, (3) procedural fairness,
and (4) distributive fairness.51 Levi and colleagues would
argue that the most important elements for a “value-
based legitimacy” are (1) the trustworthiness of the
government (that in turn depends on the performance,
the leadership motivations and the administrative com-
petence) and (2) procedural justice.52 Gilley has also
grouped a long list of suitable indicators into five
“schools”: (1) the particularistic, (2) the sociological,
(3) the developmental, (4) the democratic, and (5)
the bureaucratic.53 While the particularistic school high-
lights the time and context sensitivity of the concept that
makes generalizations difficult, the other four are more
substantial. The sociological school underlines social and
cultural conditions that create a feeling of belonging; the
developmental school is preoccupied with the evaluation
of allocation and distribution of goods; the democratic
school is concerned with just and fair procedures; and,
finally, the bureaucratic school refers to the strength and
effectiveness of state institutions. The expansiveness of
these lists might suffice to drive home the point. There
exists a magnitude of defining features for when we can
speak of legitimacy of political regimes. On an even more
basic level, one might be tempted to include free choice
and voluntary consent into such a definition in the first
place.
The ladder of abstraction assumes in general that the
defining elements stand in a necessary and sufficient
condition structure.54 I follow this assumption here and
argue that that the defining elements of the list stand in
a hierarchy. Going up the ladder one step therefore means
adding a defining feature. If we use a maximalist concep-
tion of legitimacy and include all definitional features, the
empirical referent side containing concrete autocratic
regimes will be (almost) empty. If we apply minimalist
conception, then the empirical referent box will therefore
be more populated (please see figure 3).55 Consequently,
to apply the concept of legitimacy and legitimation in non-
democratic contexts means to curtail its semantic range at
a lower level. Only sociological, developmental, and
bureaucratic conceptions of legitimacy can be used to
identify empirical non-democratic referents. However,
procedural features are increasingly gaining importance
with the global spread of “electoral”56 and “competitive
authoritarianism.”57
Without doubt, using the concept of legitimacy in
non-democratic contexts contains an inherent danger.
Such analysis can be misused to apologize and relativize
autocratic rule, and might go so far to defend the
normative foundations of a concrete autocratic regime
ruling in a specific country. However, this is not the
Figure 2
Semantic map
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intention behind making the concept applicable to
autocracies. Instead, it has been shown above that
neighboring concepts can also be used, but that these
carry a different semantic nuance and empirical
scope. Legitimacy—used here in the empirical-analytical
tradition—only refers to the phenomenon that nolens
volens some people in autocratic regimes do believe that
their rulers are entitled to rule to some extent.
What we can learn from the list of definitional features,
however, is that there are domains that remain reserved for
democratic polities. While autocracies can refer to a basic
sense of belonging in underlining nationalist argumenta-
tion patterns or can even exceed democracies with regard
to bureaucratic capacities, efficiency, and economic
growth, they are mostly blank when it comes to “deeper”
values of political rule like fairness, consent, and the respect
for human rights. Here, autocracies are often mute or
evasive. When autocracies need to justify their right to rule,
i.e., a kind of second-order justification, they need to curtail
the discourse at a certain level in order to succeed. A
hypothesis for future research could be generated here: the
more an autocratic regimes climbs up the list of defining
features in justifying its right to rule, the less it says about
fundamental values. While its speeches, news, and texts are
full of reference to nationalism or religion as a source of
belonging and praise for economic efficiency and well-
being, clear indications for procedural and consensual values
remain sparse—if mentioned at all.
Name versus Extension: How Do We
Know It When We See It?
In general, the naming of a phenomenon—with some
rare exceptions like onomatopoeia—is arbitrary and does
not follow a certain motivation. For the purpose of this
essay, I extend the mere linguistic relationship between
name and extension to the methodical challenge of
identifying proper empirical referents. We attach the name
“table” to any object with a raised levelness that we observe
in a class room. This is an easy endeavor. However, how
should we name what we observe, let’s say in today’s rural
Russia? Do people there view Putin’s rule as “legitimate”?
And what are the instruments out of our social science
methods toolbox to identify this belief as legitimacy?
When can we use the name “legitimacy” for an empirical
phenomenon that we observe? Or, more bluntly: how do
we know it when we see it?
Of course, the methodological challenge of applying
the concept of legitimacy to empirical reality does not
apply to autocratic regimes solely. The most powerful
criticism of the concept is that it is difficult to empirically
observe. This line of critique argues that legitimacy is
a property that is only observable when it is gone, or at
least when it is in decline. Only if legitimacy is gone or in
sharp decline, does it have some influence on observable
variables, such as stability. It is a dilemma that—in the
eyes of the critics—is unsolvable.58 Przeworski has led the
group of critics to a second and related argument. For him,
the entire concept of legitimacy should be dismissed when
explaining macro-phenomena like stability, on the ground
that “isolated individuals do not shake political orders.”
Przeworski argues that if legitimacy is understood in an
individualist sense (as done in this essay), it has only “little
bearing on the issue of stability,”59 because only organized
interests matter. So, while one faction of critics insist that
we can only see legitimacy in decline as it then triggers
observable phenomena like stability, a second declares that
it lacks even this influence. These are the severe challenges
on the democratic side; the challenges on the autocratic
side of the regime spectrum are even more difficult.60
There are two routes by which we can attempt to
measure legitimacy: survey research and behavioral indi-
cators. Survey research constitutes in general the gold
standard in knowing what people actually believe. How-
ever, this is very challenging in autocratic settings. Social
scientists face a doubly troubling situation. On the one
hand, some questions are too politically sensitive to be
asked. (Self-)Censorship prevents us from knowing what
people actually believe. On the other hand, the respond-
ents face an incentive structure in which they rather
answer what is socially desirable and less risky for their
own physical integrity. As a result, preference falsification
is widespread.61
Nevertheless, I would like to encourage survey
researchers to think more thoroughly of legitimacy
questions. Recently, the sixth wave of the European
Social Survey has pioneered this type of research. They
have explicitly included a battery of detailed questions
that measures the legitimacy dimension.62 It has been
designed with a view on democracies. However, what we
Figure 3
Ladder of abstraction for the concept of legit-
imacy
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could learn for the autocratic pole is their construction.
They argue that we need a distinction between what
people think how democracy should look and how it
actually is. Following this line of research, I would propose
a third dimension besides expectation (how it should be)
and evaluation (how it is). For autocracies, we should also
aim to include questions on the official legitimacy claim of
the regime.
This would leave us in future research with a double
yardstick. On the one hand, an open question should
inquire what characterizes a good political order in the
eyes of the respondents. This question could be a func-
tional equivalent for the questions what democracy means
to you. It refers to the expectations of the citizens. On the
other hand, survey questions should inquire about the
official legitimacy claims of the regime. These questions
need to uncover how often a government refers to certain
justification, how much emphasis the government places
on it, and if we can observe subtle shifts over time.63
The obvious challenge for social scientists lies in com-
piling a list of possible legitimacy claims in autocratic
settings.64 The list should be exhaustive, but does not
need to be mutually exclusive as legitimacy formulae are
often a mélange of different elements.
These two yardsticks would inform us how the rule
should be from the perspective of the ruled and how the
rulers officially justify their rule. In a second step, these
dimensions should be confronted with the evaluation of
the respondents: to what extent are your expectations
fulfilled? And to what extent do the beliefs of the people
(e.g., in your family/ your neighborhood/ your work-
place) meet the claims of the regime? It goes without
saying that these questions are politically sensitive and
a neutral way of formulating must be found. They will
suffer from preference falsification.65 Yet what I tenta-
tively propose here is push the debate forward. The most
promising route seems to me to follow a triangular
structure (expectation, claim, belief) and argue that only
if these dimensions converge, we can assume that an
autocratic regime is viewed as legitimate.
Survey research is difficult and sometimes just impos-
sible in autocratic settings. In-depth, qualitative fieldwork
is then the only route that uncovers the complexity of
autocratic legitimacy. Expert surveys by which country
experts judge to what extent they think what the people
think can be a complementary source of information.66
Such surveys pool the expertise of case-specific knowledge
and try to combine the best of two worlds: the qualitative
case knowledge by assuring the comparability across cases.
Yet it should be clear that expert surveys on legitimacy in
autocracies can only express the (expert’s) evaluation of the
(people’s) evaluation. When it comes to the official
legitimacy claims of the regime, these can be distilled by
using qualitative and quantitative text analyses of repre-
sentative texts. Speeches, official newspapers, or even
textbooks in school curricula are innovative ways of
approaching the question how these regimes justify that
they are entitled to rule.67 The alternative to survey
research is a measurement via observable phenomena.
Research on democracies has established tax compliance as
an apt behavioral indicator for measuring legitimacy. The
higher the share of people is that comply with tax rules, the
more a regime is viewed as legitimate by the people.68 In
earlier work, Levi has also studied voluntary military
service as an adequate indicator.69 The selection of a suit-
able indicator for the autocratic pole must be driven by
similar concerns: Do we find an empirically observable
behavior that is not caused by repression, but instead
demonstrates by and large a voluntary act that is motivated
by perceiving the current rule arrangement as being
justified.
The most intuitive datum in this regard is mobilized
political protest. The argument is straightforward: if
people protest, they show their dissatisfaction with the
ruler. However, protest cannot be equated with non-
legitimacy. Not all protest is protest against the incum-
bents. We need to inquire more in depth who protests
and why these people protest? This brings again survey
research into play. The recent Arab uprisings have shown
that social scientists attempted to collect this information
about protesters’ motivations.70 When going beyond the
size and frequency of protest, and inquiring into the
motivations, a necessary step is to use protest as a valid
indicator for legitimacy. However, there are two further
methodical caveats. Firstly, we tend to focus one-sidedly
on successful cases of protest and overlook negative cases.
Non-protest also cannot be equated with legitimacy.
Secondly, we tend to overestimate the effect of declining
legitimacy if we do not control for the effect of repression.
Roughly speaking, protest emerges out of a conjunction of
declining legitimacy and declining repression. When
a window of opportunity opens by less repression, protest
becomes just more probable. If we take protest as a mere
indicator for declining legitimacy, we fail to account for
this basic relationship between repression and protest
possibility.
A promising alternative behavioral indicator has re-
cently been brought forward by Dimitrov.71 He finds that
in communist regimes people submitted official citizen
complaints. These complaints were targeted at material
issues (housing, car, etc.), but also raised political issues.
Not unlike compliance with taxation, the magnitude and
content of citizen complaints can tell us something about
the extent to which the ruled see the rulers as legitimate. In
a similar vein, the responsiveness debate has sparked
scholarly interest for the cases of Vietnam and China.
Based on novel data, it has been shown that responsiveness
and legitimacy plays an important role in the resilience of
these autocratic regimes.72 The same holds true for related
conceptions of “consultative authoritarianism”73 and
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“authoritarian deliberation.”74 Here it is argued that
autocracies consult their citizens and provide participation
channels in order to increase the legitimacy of offices,
regulations, and laws.75 It should also be noted that these
debates about responsiveness, consultation, and delibera-
tion in unlikely settings demonstrate that legitimacy does
not need to remain on a macro-regime level. While
Weber’s three types of legitimate rule have traditionally
focused on the regime as a whole and a general narrative,
newer research provides a micro-foundational perspective.
These newer studies not only look at more concrete
(and tangible) laws and regulations, but also break down
their empirically driven, fine-grained analysis to local and
regional levels. As such, we can observe a growing con-
ceptual flexibility beyond the nation-state. Moreover,
natural experiments have been used to inquire into the
influence of foreign media exposure on public support in
autocracies.76 Semi-structured interviews and online
observatory participation has increased our understanding
in how autocracies foster an ideological belief among its
citizens.77 What these works unite is their innovative
approach to studying how and to what extent autocracies
try to legitimate their rule (please see table 2). This
methodological creativity is needed in future research.
Conclusion: Why Should We Care
about Studying Legitimacy in
Autocracies?
The question of legitimacy is a known unknown for
autocracies. Autocratic leaders realize that it is important
for them to know what people think, but they often lack
the information to assess to what extent they are seen as
legitimate. Folkloric tales of Oriental and Chinese
emperors mingling with the people to learn what they
think indicate that it has been a known unknown
throughout history. Nazi Germany invested large sums
and actually revolutionized survey research in order to
ascertain what the people really think.78 So even the most
brutish regime wants to know what its citizens believe.
Today, we have case-based evidence on a range of
countries with China and Russia at the forefront and
among the most active in fostering a legitimacy belief.79
The recent wave of scholarship on authoritarian
politics becomes increasingly aware that these regimes
try to legitimate their rule. As such, it has become
a known unknown in academia as well. The whole
innovative potential of social science methods needs to
be harnessed in order to gradually learn more about this
terrain. However, as Sartori has warned us some decades
ago: “the progress of quantification should lag—in whatever
discipline—behind its qualitative and conceptual prog-
ress.”80 This conceptual essay has been written in this
Sartorian spirit and attempts to increase our understanding
of legitimacy in an unlikely political setting. It has made
use of the linguistic Ogden-Richards triangle to system-
atically discuss the concept. While it has offered a defini-
tion and a semantical map of rival concepts, it has argued
that autocracies can indeed legitimate their rule, but do so
on a more superficial level. They need to legitimate their
rule with more neutral terms like efficiency, capacity, and
performance, but remain by and large silent when
justifying their right to rule in a deeper sense. Values of
fairness, human rights, and voluntary consent are usually
not in the arsenal of autocratic legitimacy claims. Instead,
it can be hypothesized that autocracies need to sever the
public discourse at this level. This is open to debate.
What is not, however, is that the topic has become
a major concern in the comparative study of authoritar-
ianism.
Notes
1 There is a terminological debate about the differences
between authoritarian and autocratic regimes. I per-
ceive autocracy as the umbrella term that unites
Table 2
Methodological approaches to the study of legitimacy in autocracies
Expectation
(yardstick I)
Official Claim
(yardstick II)
Legitimacy
Belief Action
Methodical
approximation
- Qualitative fieldwork
- Survey research
- Quantitative and
qualitative text
analysis
- Survey research
- Qualitative fieldwork
- Survey research
Observable datum,
behavioral indicator
(protest, citizen
complaints, etc.)
Methodological
challenge
- Comparability
- (Self-) Censorship
- Preference
Falsification
- Representative text
corpus
- (Self-) Censorship
- Preference
Falsification
- Comparablity
- (Self-) Censorship
- Preference Falsification
- For expert surveys:
“Evaluation of an
evaluation”
Isolation of effect of
legitimacy
Source: Author
September 2018 | Vol. 16/No. 3 661
different forms of authoritarian, sultanistic, but also
totalitarian regimes. As such, it is closest to mark the
antipode to democracy.
2 E.g., Rigby and Feher 1982; Pakulski 1986.
3 Geddes 1999, Pepinsky 2014.
4 Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2006, Smith 2005.
5 Schedler 2013, Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009.
6 Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007.
7 Svolik 2009, 2012; Arriola 2009; Magaloni 2008.
8 Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; Kailitz and
Stockemer 2015; Grauvogel and von Soest 2014;
Gerschewski 2013; Holbig, 2013; Gilley 2009.
9 Davenport 2007.
10 Sartori 1984, 22–23; Gerring 1999; Schedler 2011.
11 Sartori 1970, Freeden 1994.
12 Sartori 1970, 1040–1046; Goertz 2009.
13 Würtenberger 1982.
14 Collins 1986, 155–158.
15 Weber 1978, 213.
16 Ibid., 212.
17 Weber 2005, 129.
18 Beetham 1991.
19 Ibid., 16.
20 Ibid., 65.
21 Barker 2001, 30–40.
22 Ibid., 30.
23 Beetham 1991, 91, italics original.
24 Barker 2001, 22–25.
25 Würtenberger 1982.
26 Geddes and Zaller, 1989.
27 Easton 1965, 159.
28 Ibid., 273.
29 Scharpf 1999, 12.
30 For Easton, legitimacy refers only to the diffuse support
towards the political regime and the authorities. The
same holds true for trust that is gained via experience
(whereas legitimacy is gained via socialization) and that
refers also only to the modus of diffuse support for the
regime or the authorities. For a discussion, please see the
helpful overview by Fuchs and Klingemann 2009.
31 I leave out the group of actors with indifferent belief
and indifferent behavior.
32 Easton 1965, 159.
33 Svolik 2012.
34 Wedeen 1999.
35 Klingemann and Fuchs 1995, Norris 1999.
36 Levi and Stoker 2000, 476.
37 Kaase 1999, 2–3.
38 Hardin 1999, 24.
39 Levi and Stoker 2000, 476.
40 Shklar 1993, 184.
41 Freeden 2009, 195.
42 Ibid., 198.
43 Hirschman 1970.
44 Ibid., p. 78.
45 Hirschman 1993.
46 Gert 2013, 4.
47 Gandhi 2008, Magaloni 2008, Svolik 2009.
48 E.g., Haggard and Noland 2011.
49 Sartori 1970, 1040–1046; Goertz 2009.
50 Barker 2001, 9.
51 Weatherford 1992, 150.
52 Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009.
53 Gilley 2009, 31–57.
54 Goertz 2006, 27–68.
55 If we were to favor a family resemblance structure, the
relationship could be the reverse. An increase in the
defining feature would then not lead to a decrease of
the empirical referents, but could rather lead to an
increase in extension; Goertz 2006, 40–44 and
69–94. A second basic concern of the ladder of
abstraction could refer to the hierarchical order of the
list that I propose here. The order should be seen as
a suggestion and can be re-arranged. Yet the impor-
tant idea here is that we should distinguish between
“thick” and “thin,” i.e., between maximalist and
minimalist definitions.
56 Schedler 2006.
57 Levitsky and Way 2010.
58 Marquez 2015, O’Kane 1993.
59 Przeworski 1991, 28.
60 von Haldenwang 2017.
61 Kuran 1991, 1997.
62 Weßels 2016.
63 See, e.g., for the Polish case Bernhard 1993, 24–45.
64 Such a list could comprise for the ideational
dimension in nationalism, tradition, charisma,
religion, ethnicity, historical narrative (e.g., civil war,
anti-colonial struggle, independence movement),
political ideology, international frontlines. For the
performance dimensions the list could
include law and order, economic performance,
social welfare.
65 Kuran 1991, 1997.
66 Grauvogel and von Soest 2014.
67 Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2017.
68 Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009.
69 Levi 1997.
70 Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015; Thyen and
Gerschewski 2017.
71 Dimitrov 2014.
72 Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016; Malesky and Schuler, 2010.
73 Truex 2017.
74 He and Warren 2011; Fishkin et al. 2010.
75 Stromseth, Malesky, and Gueorguiev 2017.
76 Kern and Hainmueller 2009.
77 Dukalskis 2017; Han 2015.
78 Friedrich 1957, 154–160.
79 Gill 2015, Holbig 2013, Holbig and Gilley 2010.
80 Sartori 1970, 1038.
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